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him for their political positions, drawing on his thought (or his aphorisms) to legitimize their stances on human nature, power, and foreign policy: antiwar liberals, but also the liberal hawks that supported the Iraq war, as well as the stalwart conservative backers of the war on terror, even Barack Obama and his neoconservative critics. The number of scholarly, book-length treatments of Niebuhr has accelerated as well (Harries and Platten 2010; Stevens 2010; Dorrien 2010; Diggins 2011; Lemert 2011) . Others have invoked Niebuhr to argue for a new (actually old) foreign policy framework (Lieven and Hulsman 2006) . How can these presumably diametrically different political factions all claim Niebuhr? Why, for that matter, Niebuhr, and why now? What is this about?
A Brief Primer on International Relations Theory and the Origins of Cold War Liberalism
Because arguments about foreign policy are at the heart of the Niebuhr revival, a brief primer on international relations theory is in order. There are several schools of international relations theory, but in the immediate post -World War II period, two came to dominate American foreign policy: realism and liberal internationalism. The old isolationist (America "goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy," now sometimes called paleo-conservative) school had mostly disappeared in the wake of World War II and the postwar assumption of world leadership on the part of the United States. 4 Largely discredited was the idealist tradition associated with Woodrow Wilson's crusading interventionist schemes for transforming nations and changing human nature. The extreme right wing's strategy to "roll back" international communism through armed confrontation and, if necessary, preemptive nuclear strikes, for the most part failed to capture established foreign policy circles (especially after General Douglas MacArthur was cashiered by President Harry S. Truman in 1951), although aggressive rollback remained a noisy debating point throughout the 1950s and 1960s (see Burnham 1947; Goldwater 1962) . Neoconservatism (to be discussed shortly ) had not yet been born as a coherent political ideology. Post -World War II foreign policy was essentially a debate and compromise between realists and liberal internationalists.
Typically, realists see rivalry and conflict among nation-states as unavoidable, and thus they approach the international system in terms of states exercising power, whether military, economic, or diplomatic. Realists acknowledge the ignoble motives of the nation-state; they orient policies and actions according 4. The phrase is from John Quincy Adams (1821). to what they see as in the best national interests of the United States. They have little concern for the internal nature of other regimes or what those regimes do to their own people. Realists do not much bother with issues such as human rights; what matters is the external behavior of states thirsting for power. Liberal internationalists aspire to transcend the amoral nature of power politics. While they don't forswear the use of force, military or otherwise, in international conflicts, they place trust in multilateral institutions, international law, and diplomacy. The United States must pursue its national interests in foreign affairs, but liberal internationalists view those interests far more broadly than realists do. Whereas realists tend to care mostly about America's interests, liberal internationalists care equally about America's values. As such, liberal internationalists do care about the internal nature of other states, including their adherence (or not) to human rights and democratic processes.
The overall thrust of postwar American politics is often referred to as Cold War liberalism: liberal domestic policy following in the wake of the New Deal's modest state intervention into the economy and establishment of an equally modest social safety net, combined with an aggressive foreign (and domestic) policy confronting communism. 5 The containment of international communism -also known as the Truman Doctrine -contained features of both realism and liberal internationalism. The Soviet Union was understood to be a palpable, perilous foe whose challenge to the West had to be met head-on. Meeting the communist challenge would entail not just a massive buildup of armaments and strategy of careful brinksmanship but all manner of support of multilateral institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, as well as the shrewd use of foreign aid in international development.
Notwithstanding the fact that the policy of containment merged elements of the two dominant postwar foreign policy schools, proponents of realism and liberal internationalism clashed throughout the Cold War. And on the periphery of the central debate were the rollback Right's critique of containment as not being muscular enough and the Left's critique of containment as being needlessly and dangerously hostile. Niebuhr, whose lecturing and writing brought him into the broad public arena, sought to articulate a viable -and Christian moral -basis for Cold War liberalism. 
Elements of Niebuhr's Theology
Niebuhr's views on foreign policy and international relations derived from his theology, in which original sin was the key concept. Original sin -the human capacity for evil -was quite real for Niebuhr, but it existed not because of a literal biblical fall from grace that each human being had to bear, much less in the traditional Christian shame of sex. While not ontologically true, biblical myths nonetheless provide moral guidelines for human action, in Niebuhr's view. Bible stories are myths that reflect the holistic character of life, which cannot be comprehended through reason or scientific knowledge alone. As one Niebuhr commentator puts it, myth is necessary both to complete and to contradict the mechanistic and rational world of modern and reasonable people. The religious myths of creation and redemption, for instance, carve a middle ground between the scientific tendency to view human existence as mechanical, without purpose, and a religious tendency to see in progress an ethical improvement that links morality to scientific naturalism, thereby seeing transcendence in the very processes of science and history. History is human drama but without a telos (Naveh 2002: 37 -44) .
Intrinsic to the condition of freedom itself, sin inhered in individual self-interest and pride (what Niebuhr termed the "corruption of inordinate self-love") and the impossibility of human perfection. Sin for Niebuhr was of more than theological consequence for individual salvation; it had a social dimension. Individual human beings are in principle possessed of rationality and sympathy that, on occasion, arouse in them a sense of justice and induce self-criticism. Individuals thus have the capacity to transcend self-interest; they possess the capability to make moral choices. But this self-transcendence is difficult, if not impossible, for human societies and social groups, Niebuhr averred. There is less reason -literally -in groups to guide and check impulse and reduced capacity to understand the needs of others. An individual human can act morally; organizations, societies, and nation-states, most of all, cannot. Whenever there comes a choice between a moral purpose and the interests of an institution or nation-state, the collective entity has to defend its interests, Niebuhr wrote in his famous 1932 tract, Moral Man and Immoral Society. The nation is a corporate unity, held together much more by force and emotion than by mind (Niebuhr 1932: xxv, 88) . "The selfishness of nations is proverbial" (ibid.: 84). The nation-state can never sacrifice itself for a moral cause.
Niebuhr resisted what he considered the naive optimism of liberals and the demonization of the other that was characteristic of conservatives. His religiously rooted politics, given the name Christian realism and locatable within the broad legacy of Saint Augustine's fifth-century classic, City of God (1984) , found itself Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/public-culture/article-pdf/28/1 (78)/113/455468/0280113.pdf by UC SAN DIEGO LIBRARY user on 30 January 2018 1 1 9 6. Postmillennial and premillennial beliefs embody one of the key divisions in American Protestantism since the early twentieth century. Postmillennialism is the theological doctrine that understood spiritual and cultural progress as paving the way for the thousand years of God's kingdom, after which Christ would come to earth a second time. Late nineteenth-century American Protestants believed that the Holy Spirit working through Christians would so Christianize culture that Jesus could return to provide the capstone to a thousand-year reign of perfect peace. Human effort can speed the advent of a perfect new world. This became a central orientation of modernist, liberal, optimistic, mainline Protestantism. In contrast to this progressive story, premillennialism, associated with fundamentalist Protestants and a more traditional, orthodox theology of human sinfulness, saw history in terms of eras or "dispensations" of regression owing to the fact that human beings are by nature sinful. Historical change takes place not via human actions but through divine intervention, the details of which are revealed in Scripture. In fundamentalist Protestantism, history doesn't just reflect the Bible; the Bible is history. The present age, in this view, is marked by apostasy in the churches and the moral collapse of Christian civilization. This age is prior to Christ's kingdom; the millennium lies wholly in the future, after Christ returns to a very troubled world. See Marsden 1980. in some resonance with international relations theory based on the work of the early modern political philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1958 [1651 ). For Augustine, human beings were inherently flawed. Evil is at work in every human heart, and it cannot be defeated in this world, thus the City of Man cannot become the City of God. Civilizations inevitably collapse, both morally and literally. What humans must strive for is individual inner transformation. Niebuhr brought Augustine's outlook on evil and individual salvation and in effect married it to Hobbes's elemental insight that conflict is inherent to human life. For Hobbes, humans are motivated by appetites and aversions; needs and desires are infinite. Men (using the nomenclature of Hobbes's day) come to desire the things other men desire and hence find themselves in a constant state of competition and conflict. Indeed, the state of nature closely resembles civil war -a chaotic war of all against all. What inclines us toward peace is recognition of our shared fear of death. In Hobbes's world, the only way to secure order and alleviate the war of all against all is to swear obedience to the unaccountable sovereign as the sole political authority.
Distinctly anti-utopian, Niebuhr (1941 -43) acidly criticized as naive the hope that any human program could make social conflict disappear. Such hope was itself evidence of sin, the pride of assuming the possibility of human perfection. In reality, human knowledge and power are limited, partial, and contingent; ultimate truth belongs only to God. Niebuhr's critique of the Social Gospel provides a window onto his thinking and his complicated relationship with liberalism. The Social Gospel, that late nineteenth-, early twentieth-century religious movement on the importance of good works and the mobilization of citizens to help the poor and do good politically, embodied the central motifs of the postmillennial liberal Protestant worldview. 6 In the Social Gospel tradition, building the Kingdom Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/public-culture/article-pdf/28/1 (78)/113/455468/0280113.pdf by UC SAN DIEGO LIBRARY user on 30 January 2018 of God on earth meant civic action to rectify social problems -which entailed Christian engagement in the world largely for the betterment of the working class and the poor. Capitalism's selfish, predatory character was inimical to the Golden Rule. The Social Gospel moved from the traditional Protestant concerns with sin and individual salvation to tackle the salvation of the social order. In this respect, the Social Gospel embodied a deep optimism. With its reform programs, its pacifism, and its commitment to international cooperation, the Social Gospel stressed God's immanent presence in history (Gladden 1889; Rauschenbusch 1912 Rauschenbusch , 1964 Rauschenbusch [1907 ; White 1990).
Niebuhr had no problem with civic action to address poverty and inequality. In his Detroit parish, in the 1920s, Niebuhr saw the ravages of industrial capitalism. His economics, at least early in his career, were informed by a Marxian recognition of the class struggle. Niebuhr shared Social Gospel theologian Walter Rauschenbusch's condemnation of capitalism. Indeed, until well into the 1930s Niebuhr castigated the New Deal from the left. Rather, his objection to the Social Gospel lay with the naive theological and political confidence that underpinned it, its perfectionist illusions that civic action could create the Kingdom of God on earth, and thus its fundamental misunderstanding of human nature and the nature of power. For Niebuhr, the problem with liberalism, generally speaking, was its immature faith in reason and in the ability of the free individual to make social justice. The parallel predicament of religious liberalism, in his view, was the naive faith that love leads to justice (Niebuhr 1932; Fox 1985: 88 -110; Lemert 2011: 45 -57) . But the persistence of evil in history requires skepticism toward any approach that seeks to banish violence from politics. Because groups act out of self-interest, and conflict is inevitable, power can only be challenged by power. Thus Niebuhr's advocacy of armed conflict against the Nazis, and armed challenge to Soviet expansionism subsequently, embodied a countermodernist Christian ethics rooted less in Scripture per se as validated by historical experience. 7 7. Jason W. Stevens (2010) makes the case for Niebuhr as a countermodernist, challenging liberal Protestantism's modernism but not from a fundamentalist, or antimodern, position. This is also the basis for labeling Niebuhr and Christian realism as neo-orthodox, not orthodox, in theological predisposition. Niebuhr was influenced in his critique of liberal Protestantism by the prominent Swiss neo-orthodox theologian, Karl Barth, but he harshly criticized Barth's view that the church should confine itself to preaching the Bible and be neutral with regard to political life. Barth's neutrality counseled the church's cooperation with communist authorities in Central Europe, a politics (based on a theology) that Niebuhr believed irresponsible. In the end, notwithstanding his denunciation of its optimism and perfectionism, Niebuhr was always a liberal advocate of social Christianity, of working in the world to make it better. Liberalism's implicit utopianism, its illusion of human perfectibility, was, at bottom, the basis of Niebuhr's conflict with his contemporary public intellectual, John Dewey, and the feature that Niebuhr believed liberalism shared, at the end of the day, with communism. The latter was a form of revolutionary utopianism that justified inhumane means in the pursuit of impossible ends, Niebuhr concluded (as did several other political theorists of his day, such as Karl Popper [1945] , Jacob Talmon [1952] , Czesław Miłosz [1953] , and Isaiah Berlin [1969] ). Communism was thus a demonic (political) religion. But Niebuhr's was no "America the chosen" political theology. He consistently found himself at odds with American optimism and the tradition of American exceptionalism -that deep-seated belief in America's destiny shared by Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals, realists and liberal internationalists alike. American exceptionalism, of course, is the belief that the United States is a special nation, a "chosen" nation, the embodiment of God's gift of freedom, and thus constitutes the greatest earthly force for good the world has known. In some versions, America's exceptional nature is designated by God; in others by its distinct, founding commitment to liberty. The ideological outcome is the same: America's values are beneficent and universal; its mission is to show other nations of the world the path to liberty. Because of its exceptional nature, America's interests can never really be in conflict with its values.
Niebuhr had little patience for this; the saga of the United States as God's innocent bearer of democracy was one of his chief targets in the 1950s. Nonetheless, Niebuhr did exhibit a faith -sometimes wary, other times far less so -in the United States. Again, for Niebuhr, human collectivities of whatever ideology were likely to act in a self-interested manner, that is, in his theological system, immorally. Niebuhr's break with the sanguinity of mainline Protestant theology and political liberalism was rooted in a neo-orthodox pessimism that power always corrupts. His gruff faith in democracy derived from the belief that democracy was the best way to limit power (hence his famous aphorism: "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible, but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary" [Niebuhr 1944: ix] ). Because the United States was a democracy, it was more likely to behave more reasonably than its communist counterparts.
Niebuhr's unsentimental view of human nature clearly displays a "conservative cast," as the sociologist of religion Will Herberg (1989: 39 -40) observed in 1956. But, if the rejection of the possibility of human perfection allied Niebuhr's thinking to political (and some religious) conservatives, the application of that judgment to the United States and its exceptionalist, messianic, self-conception caused him to part company with his erstwhile conservative allies. So, while he was the Power cannot be wielded without guilt, he wrote, because it is never transcendent over interest -even when it tries to subject itself to universal standards and places itself under the control of a nascent worldwide community (Niebuhr 1952: 37) .
Niebuhr expounded on this tension in his book The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (1944) . Children of light was Niebuhr's metaphor for those who underestimated the power and potential evil of self-interest, both individual and collective, in modern society. The children of light presumed the essential goodness of humans and the worthy intentions of institutions and governments and believed in the power of exalted ideas of peace and universalism. In this regard Niebuhr regarded them as virtuous, because they possessed some conception of a higher law than their own wills, but also as dangerously sentimental and foolish, because they did not understand the nature of power and the tragic (in the sense of inevitably conflictual) character of international relations. The children of light, as we can easily discern, were the liberals; they imagined that human beings could overcome evil by merely avowing lofty and moral ideals. Although published before the end of World War II, the book was used to bash liberals and pacifists in the politics of the postwar. The children of light believed, as many prominent liberal Protestants did in the late 1940s, that nations should just disavow the use of nuclear weapons. Or, like Henry Wallace and his followers, they saw in the Soviet Union a benign and worthy partner rather than a contingently convenient, but dangerous wartime, ally. 8 To Niebuhr, communism, like fascism, was evil; hence the optimistic stance of liberals (secular and ecclesiastical alike) reflected both the idolatrous faith in man and blindness to the necessity for coercion in the hard struggle for justice.
What was far less noticed in the politics of the postwar was Niebuhr's warning on the children of darkness. Wiser than the children of light because they understood power and the potency of self-interest, the children of darkness were evil because they knew no law beyond the self. The children of darkness asserted self-interest without regard to the whole, whether the whole be conceived as the immediate community, or the total community of mankind, or the total order of the world (Niebuhr 1944 (Niebuhr , 1955 . The children of darkness were, of course, the totalitarians, of fascist and Stalinist varieties. But as the Cold War intensified, Niebuhr's critique could apply to militaristic anticommunism and McCarthyism as well. Convinced that the evils of communism were so great that the United States was justified in using any weapon against them, these new children of darkness thereby closely approached the ruthlessness of the communist foe they so reviled (Niebuhr 1952: 40) .
Niebuhr himself approached that threshold of ruthlessness. He equivocated on the question of dropping the atomic bomb on Japan -even in light of Christian just war doctrine. He objected to the use of the bomb without warning, but unlike his colleagues in a 1946 statement of the mainline church leaders on the bomb (Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America 1946), Niebuhr refused to declare that the bomb should in no case have been used. The necessity to defeat the monstrous evil of the Axis powers had been all-important for Niebuhr.
Niebuhr and American Cold War Foreign Policy
It is said that Niebuhr's political philosophy released American liberals from the shackles of Wilson's idealist legacy in foreign policy. And indeed, post -World War II Cold War liberalism embraced the amoral group conflict and hardheadedness articulated by the likes of Kennan, Schlesinger, and Hans Morgenthau, among others. Niebuhr's political vision and activism weren't confined to foreign policy; his views on domestic and international affairs were interconnected. Together with the above-mentioned luminaries, Niebuhr joined with John Kenneth Galbraith, Eleanor Roosevelt, and Walter Reuther to establish the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) in 1947 as an anticommunist left organization to rally American liberals in support of both the Truman administration's Fair Deal and containment policies. In the ADA and Niebuhr's view, these policies were parallel and, at bottom, linked: containment embodied the necessity to challenge communism militarily but, analogous to domestic policy, a robust commitment to international development as well. Embracing the Niebuhrian tenets of proximate justice and rejection of utopianism, the ADA's support of government-led action on the domestic and the international fronts meant that its version of the liberal consensus represented a variety of social democracy.
No doubt this peculiarly American amalgam of liberal ideological commitments reflected the difficulty of defending (much less extending) the New Deal against postwar conservative reaction while at the same time coming to terms Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/public-culture/article-pdf/28/1 (78)/113/455468/0280113.pdf by UC SAN DIEGO LIBRARY user on 30 January 2018 with the perception of rampaging international communism. Indeed, the postwar conservative reaction, especially McCarthyism, had its impact and, in part, lay behind the retrenchment of the social democratic aspects of the liberal agenda. Niebuhr, and the organizations he championed, abandoned any radical notion of economic democracy (or, in Niebuhr's framework, Christian socialism) in the postwar period, retreating to welfare state reformism and Schlesinger's (1949) notion of "the vital center." 9 Like the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the ADA soon became absorbed in Democratic Party national politics, a pillar of the postwar anticommunist liberal consensus.
So too did the complexities and inherent political contradictions of containment have an impact on the understanding of America's foreign policy. As containment policy evolved, it meant confronting, but not militarily engaging the Soviet Union directly or in its postwar geographic sphere of influence. But preventing the Soviet Union from extending its influence in the nations emerging from colonial domination was another matter altogether. It was in the postcolonial Third World where the Cold War primarily played out. In general, post -World War II anticolonial liberation movements posed a problem for the United States. American Cold War policy was to try to identify and support anticommunist nationalists in the local efforts to liberate their countries from European colonial rule. But Communists often held the high moral ground in the revolt against European colonialism; the Communists had been consistently anticolonial. Moreover, the economic institutions of the colonial oppressors typically were associated with American-style capitalism. This tended to taint the model of political and economic development proffered by US policy makers. The United States practiced a combination of emancipation and guidance in its effort to bring the American vision of modernity to the decolonizing Third World. The Cold War liberal elite of scholars and policy makers tended to see postcolonial Third World states as unpredictable adolescents that needed to be guided and disciplined. Under the sway of modernization theory, the United States would tutor countries against communism and toward liberal democracy and markets through various means (Westad 2005: 22 -31, 110 -57) .
US-led international development in the postwar period was always a compli-9. The Vital Center was an important statement of Cold War liberalism. Taking the New Deal's regulated capitalism as beneficent and settled, the book trained most of its animus on the "doughface" progressives who would disarm the West in the face of the totalitarian challenge. In keeping with the vital center meme, the Niebuhr of Children of Light and Children of Darkness showed a surprising smugness about the democratic process, the openness of the American political system, and the unproblematic nature of socioeconomic class in the United States. (Pisani 1991) . Foreign aid was used as carrot and stick. Acceptance of the structure of capitalism, including market access and investor export of profits, was usually a condition of aid. Receipt of foreign aid was also coupled to the recipient country's political restructuring, which required that Communists and left-wing Socialists be excluded from government. Securing consent for these fundamental requirements typically included seducing local elites through the offer of aid (and bribes). If these didn't succeed at elevating American-backed groups, the United States would help local clients repress opponents by force or by helping facilitate coups d'état. Because American policy tended to label as communist any resistance to the Third World governments that had formally endorsed capitalism, democracy, and alliance with the United States, Washington policy makers reduced the potential for real alliances with popular nationalist movements.
Suffice it to say that there was and continues to be sharp debate about America's postwar containment policy, whether it was motivated by sincere apprehension about Soviet motives and actions or motivated by imperial aims -or some complicated amalgam of both. Whatever the motivations, in practice the policy led to an astounding number of military interventions or US-backed military coups in Latin America, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, the result of most of which was the devastation of those countries and the undermining of the institutions necessary for the establishment of stable politics (Westad 2005; LaFeber 1983; Schlesinger and Kinzer 1999; Vine 2009 ; National Security Archive 2014).
Niebuhr, in complicated ways as always, played into this jumble of sincere anticommunism and pursuit of empire. What distinguished Niebuhr's Christian realism from straight foreign policy realism, in the words of one of his defenders, was that Niebuhr did not forget that humans and their institutions stand under God's judgment. Christian realism sees war and the instruments of war as unfortunate necessities rather than objects of glory and veneration. Without a higher normative vision to guide and restrain it, the quest for security degenerates into perpetual militarism and interventionism (Coll 1989) . Still, in practical terms, Niebuhr's Christian realism rarely led him to depart from militaristic American foreign policy. Already noted was Niebuhr's support, however diffident, for dropping the atomic bomb on Japan. In the 1956 Suez crisis, he denounced the Eisenhower- Dulles decision not to join the British-led invasion of Egypt because he felt that its legalistic-moralistic approach was another example of the children of light playing into the hands of the Soviets (Buhle 2010). Niebuhr also supported US policy in Vietnam until late in the war. He was unable to see Ho Chi Minh as an anticolonial Marxist nationalist, as opposed to a Soviet lackey. Although Niebuhr grasped the ruthlessness and corruption of the regimes that ruled over South Vietnam, he only began raising questions about US policy in 1965 (Niebuhr 1965) . His anticommunism led him to tolerate American-supported authoritarians. As Gary Dorrien (2010: 64) puts it baldly, Niebuhr "never opposed a real American interest in the name of Christian ethics."
Vietnam split the Democratic Party into its traditional Cold War liberal bloc and an antiwar faction. For the Right, the US defeat in Vietnam constituted a grievous stain on the nation's honor. The United States' withdrawal from Vietnam, forced by America-hating leftists and weak-kneed liberals, constituted a betrayal of the noble anticommunist cause -an American version of the old stab-in-theback theory, consonant with McCarthyism's old charge of treason by the liberals (see Podhoretz 1980) . Those articulating this line most vociferously were adherents of the most recently constituted foreign policy school, neoconservatism. Like liberal internationalists, neoconservatives are internationalist in basic orientation, concerned with democracy, human rights, and the internal politics of states. They believe that US power, including, notably, military power, can -and must -be used for moral purposes. But unlike liberal internationalists, neoconservatives exhibit deep skepticism about the ability of international law and institutions to solve serious security problems and, like paleo-conservatives and many realists, they tend toward unilateral American actions. In fact, more than the other foreign policy orientations, neoconservatism now espouses the most messianic features of American exceptionalism. 10 In the period post-Vietnam, American conservatives, 10. Neoconservatism, of course, is much more than a foreign policy orientation. Neither an electoral constituency nor a grassroots movement, neoconservatism is an intellectual inclination that began in the 1960s with a trenchant critique of government overreach and the unintended consequences of liberal public policies. Although liberal in political orientation and supportive of the New Deal, the first generation of neoconservatives (including the likes of Irving Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Midge Decter, Sidney Hook, Nathan Glazer, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan) veered right because they believed the federal government by the late 1960s was guilty of engaging in social engineering. Michael Novak (1992) , an early claimant of the Niebuhrian legacy for neoconservatism, based his assertion on Niebuhr's distrust of political power. This at a time -the late 1960s -when neoconservatives saw the state as endangering the freedom found in the play of the market. Some early neoconservatives, Podhoretz chief among them, also became severe critics of "Vietnam syndrome," interpreted as post-Vietnam aversion to the assertion of US power in the international arena. Podhoretz and other neoconservatives insisted that the United States not flag in the fight Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/public-culture/article-pdf/28/1 (78)/113/455468/0280113.pdf by UC SAN DIEGO LIBRARY user on 30 January 2018 1 2 7 the neoconservatives in particular, called for an end to what they saw as the United States' inhibited, vaguely guilty, desultory foreign policy. They condemned the politics of arms control and détente with the Soviets and urged recommitment to a massive military buildup. They condemned détente as "appeasement" (Podhoretz 1976 (Podhoretz , 1977 (Podhoretz , 1980 . Many claimed Niebuhr as their inspiration.
The Niebuhr Revival, Part 1
At the beginning of this essay I called attention to the marked increase of references, articles, and books on Niebuhr and invocation of his hardheaded realism. I suggest that two events underlay the recent Niebuhr revival: the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the emergence of a new treacherous foe in global terrorism after the 9/11 attacks a decade later. The revival hinges on the presumed lessons of the Cold War.
With the unexpected demise of the Soviet Union, Cold War liberalism received new respect among pundits and scholars. Its intellectual formulators, including Kennan and Niebuhr, saw a resurgence of reputation. Conservative commentators and political theorists concluded that the United States won the Cold War. Containment had worked. The West (particularly the United States) had built up its military, ardently stood up to the Soviet challenge, waited the USSR out over several tense decades, and finally watched it implode from the weight of its internal contradictions. Conservatives attributed the defeat of Soviet communism in particular to Ronald Reagan's unwavering hostility and massive arms buildup. Reagan swept away Vietnam syndrome with reinvigorated opposition to communist revolutionary movements in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The deployment of missiles in Europe and development of "Star Wars" missile defense, along with the challenge to communist gains in the Third World, put such a strain on the Soviet economy that Kremlin attempts at reform spiraled out of control and eventuated in the collapse of the regime (Berke 1992; Kagan and Kristol 1996) . Reagan had rechanneled Niebuhr and the Cold War liberal's hardheadedness.
It is important to understand the triumphalism of this narrative and what it against international communism. Niebuhr really became important for neoconservatives in relation to foreign policy, and mostly by neoconservatism's second generation. The second generation of neoconservatives, figures such as Richard Perle, William Kristol, Douglas Feith, Paul Wolfowitz, Joshua Muravchik, Carl Gershman, Ben Wattenberg, Zalmay Khalilzad, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Kagan, Lawrence F. Kaplan, and Daniel Pipes, much more focused on foreign policy than its forbears, became dyed-in-the-wool believers in American exceptionalism and advocated military intervention to spread beneficent American values. See Fukuyama 2006 and Horwitz 2013: 112 -56. ignores -including what it ignores about Niebuhr. The renewed respect for containment and Cold War liberalism feels entirely insular in the sense that it disregards the local, concrete history and consequences of superpower actions in the Third World. In its day, perhaps the most successful feature of containment policy (and its equivalent on the Soviet side) was that armed confrontations between the two superpowers were kept indirect and out of the European theater. But this achievement had consequences that are mostly ignored, swept aside as the price of vigilance. Well intentioned or not, motivated by genuine defensive fear of the other's system, designs, and policies, or by imperial aspirations, the Cold War pattern of American and Soviet military engagement in the Third World had the clear result of devastating those countries and regions that found themselves host to superpower confrontations and interventions. This cold, hard fact embodies a larger point when assessing the celebration of Niebuhr and Cold War liberalism. As the historian David L. Chappell (2004: 27 -43) suggests, the postwar liberal consensus never assimilated Niebuhr's pessimism about human nature. Instead, the American political establishment tended to perpetuate an optimism about US actions and ends that manifested in the hubris of Cold War American foreign policy, particularly with regard to its many Third World interventions (Bacevich 2005) . Niebuhr (1952: 39) himself explained how such optimism was possible:
The moral predicament in which all human striving is involved has been raised to a final pitch for a culture and for a nation which thought it an easy matter to distinguish between justice and injustice and believed itself to be peculiarly innocent. In this way the perennial moral predicaments of human history have caught up with a culture which knew nothing of sin or guilt, and with a nation which seemed to be the most perfect fruit of that culture.
America's virtue -its innocence, the presumed nobility of its intentions -could easily become its vice. Although part of Niebuhr's critique of American innocence was that it prevented the nation from facing up to its responsibilities as a world power, he also warned in The Irony of American History that American exceptionalism was dangerously wrongheaded. The legacy of belief in exceptionalism tends to blind believers in American innocence to the frequently ruinous consequences of its policies. The point is that those who championed containment then, and those who now champion Cold War liberalism retrospectively, fail to contemplate the devastating effects of American foreign policy outside the narrow context of the US-Soviet relationship and outside the profoundly ingrained presumption of innocence of US aims and actions. They offer, instead, a narrow-minded triumphalism. The judgment of Cold War liberalism's historical efficacy has served to legitimate even the grossest historical policies and actions (Schrecker 2004) . The historian of the Cold War Odd Arne Westad (2005: 404) explains the ideological work clearly:
One of the most frightening aspects of how the Cold War ended was that the negotiated surrender of Communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union came to obscure the results of decades of disastrous interventions in the Third World. If Communism collapsed at least in part as a result of a successful US foreign policy -the thinking went -then some of this success should be reflected even in what had hitherto been commonly seen as low points in America's foreign engagements, such as the war in Vietnam. Reading history backwards, some claimed that through its antiCommunist interventions in the Third World, the United States had bought time, so that the capitalist transformation of areas such as Southeast Asia could take place from within. These changes, in turn, had paved the way for a true globalization of finance and markets in the 1990s. American sacrifice, in other words, had made it possible for all countries and individuals to aspire to take part in the post -Cold War boom. The idea was that through its ultimate triumph in the Cold War, the United States had released those forces of liberty that would -of their own accordtransform the world into liberal democracies and market economies. This is a description of the ideological discursive space where, a dozen years after the transformation of American politics by Reagan's victory, the discourses of neoliberalism and neoconservatism had essentially merged. Cold War liberalism had caused the demise of the dreaded Soviet system, replaced by the (neoliberal) ideals of free markets and democratic governance.
The Niebuhr Revival, Part 2
After the attacks of September 11, 2001 , this discourse of the presumptive retrospective success of Cold War liberalism was joined to the fight against the new existential global enemy -terrorism. In this reckoning, the US war on terror, akin to the militarized resolve practiced during the Cold War, would meet the new existential threat and bring democracy and markets to troubled corners of the world (particularly the Middle East) through the cleansing fire of violence. Neoconservatives in particular compiled competing lists of the countries the United States should invade and the regimes ripe for overthrow beyond Bush's "axis of evil" inventory of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Lists included, beyond that evil troika, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, the Palestinian Authority, Hezbollah, even Saudi Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/public-culture/article-pdf/28/1 (78)/113/455468/0280113.pdf by UC SAN DIEGO LIBRARY user on 30 January 2018 Arabia and Egypt. US military intervention, in this view, would not only rid the world of terror-associated regimes but would liberate the long-repressed desires for freedom and democracy among the people of the Middle East (Podhoretz 2002; Frum and Perle 2003; Kaplan and Kristol 2003) . Niebuhr and the lessons of his Cold War hardheadedness were important to this line of argument. 11 In his aforementioned post-9/11 address to the Family Research Council, McClay (2002) extolled Niebuhr's Cold War realism and sought to draw lessons from it. "What might we learn from Niebuhr about our current challenges, which are so different from those presented by the Cold War, though similar in requiring patience, persistence, and firm resolution?" he asked. "First and foremost, that it is right and just for Christians to support this war. Indeed, they have an obligation to do so." As would have Niebuhr, McClay speculated. McClay concluded with a bit of cheerleading.
Let me be absolutely clear, I am not here expressing sympathy for the cheap anti-Americanism of the free-riding intellectual elites who disparage our country even as they benefit from its prosperity and freedom. I am not suggesting, as former President Clinton seemed to do, that the legacy of slavery and Indian removal somehow leaves us morally disarmed to act in the present and future. I agree that our cause is just, and frankly feel a thrill of moral satisfaction when I hear our President say so, bluntly and confidently. When the President says, "Let's roll," I'm ready.
New York Times columnist David Brooks (2002) followed soon thereafter with an essay in the Atlantic, calling for a modern-day Niebuhr to solidify the rational middle against both conservative and liberal idealist extremes -an effort to make general support for the war on terror to appear the moderate, Niebuhrian, position. Brooks (2007) subsequently published an op-ed in the New York Times in which he relayed, with some satisfaction, that then senator Obama revealed Niebuhr to be his favorite philosopher. In the wake of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, liberals who sided with the Bush administration on the war invoked Niebuhr to justify their hardheaded prowar stance. New Republic editor Peter Beinart (2004 Beinart ( , 2006a Beinart ( , 2006b ) was emblematic of this positioning. Beinart sought to recast Bush's foreign policy in so Niebuhrian a fashion of tough antitotalitarianism as to reclaim it for Democrats, the party that originally had put aggressive, anticommunist Cold War foreign policy in place.
This Niebuhr revival elevated a version of his Christian realist Cold War lib-11. Although, revealingly, it must be acknowledged that the most extreme pro -Iraq war neoconservatives, Kaplan and Kristol (2003: 213) , rejected Niebuhr's views as "too irresolute." Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/public-culture/article-pdf/28/1 (78)/113/455468/0280113.pdf by UC SAN DIEGO LIBRARY user on 30 January 2018 1 3 1 eralism as the correct policy then, adapted, rejiggered, and applied as the correct tough-minded policy in the age of global terrorism, now. What is interesting and important is to notice the felt need to provide legitimacy and gravitas for the recent utopian, arguably imperialistic, policy by attaching it to a particularly skewed understanding of the previous grand foreign policy. The misunderstood success of one policy -containment -steeped in long-standing assumptions of American exceptionalism, was and is used to legitimize and excuse the overreach of another -the war on terror.
Of course, I have suggested that the Niebuhr revival also revives the fights around Niebuhr's legacy. For every nostalgic Niebuhrian Cold War warrior, there is an equal number of antiwar liberal or anti-imperialist Niebuhrians who vigorously contest the conservative appropriation of their hero. They call up Niebuhr's denunciation of "the terrible and mistaken war in Vietnam" as evidence of the inappropriateness of yoking him to a conservative politics. As Niebuhr (1969b Niebuhr ( : 1662 
reflected in 1969:
I must now ruefully change that decade-ago opinion of mine in regard to [Karl] Barth's neutralism. While I do not share his sneer at the "fleshpots of Germany and America," I must admit that our wealth makes our religious anti-Communism particularly odious. Perhaps there is not so much to choose between Communist and anti-Communist fanaticism, particularly when the latter, combined with our wealth, has caused us to stumble into the most pointless, costly, and bloody war in our history.
For example, in a scathing review the international relations historian (and selfidentified "Catholic conservative" Niebuhrian critic of American foreign policy) Andrew J. Bacevich (2006) lambasted Beinart as having shamelessly and improperly yoked Niebuhr to a narrative of national greatness that the theologian himself had expressly denounced. These Niebuhrians return to The Irony of American History and remind us of the theologian's condemnation of the cult of human perfection, a cult the United States shared with the Soviet enemy:
Perhaps the real difficulty in both the communist and the liberal dreams of a "rationally ordered" historic process is that the modern man lacks the humility to accept the fact that the whole drama of history is enacted in a frame of meaning too large for human comprehension or management. It is a drama in which fragmentary meanings can be discerned within a penumbra of mystery; and in which specific duties and responsibilities can be undertaken within a vast web of relations which are beyond our powers. (Niebuhr 1952: 88) 
The Inherent Appropriability of Dialectical Thinking?
I submit that Brooks (2002) wasn't wrong when, in his "Man on a Gray Horse" essay referred to earlier, he used Niebuhr to solidify the rational middle against conservative and liberal idealist extremes in the endeavor to make support for Bush's war on terror appear the moderate, Niebuhrian, position. Brooks's correct interpretation underscores not simply how Niebuhr can be appropriated by partisans of many different policy perspectives but also how Niebuhr's Christian realism contained its own limits. In the late 1940s, Niebuhr endeavored to stake out a middle ground between what he considered the extremes of pacifism and preemptive war, which had him supporting containment policy even as, in principle, he criticized American exceptionalism as the myth of American innocence. But I wonder if these criticisms in that context had any real purchase. Mainly, they allowed Niebuhr to issue subtle moralistic warnings that were destined to go unheeded. One could argue that Niebuhr intended for such warnings to go unheeded, as shown in his practical support of virtually all US foreign policy actions under the blanket judgment that Western imperialism was "morally ambiguous" in contrast to the clear moral evil of communism. The United States must "acknowledge the imperial dimensions of its power and accept the responsibilities which are the concomitants of power," Niebuhr (1959: 259) intoned.
Niebuhr's distinctive dialectical style typically made a particular claim, then leavened the claim by a solemn recognition of its opposite. But while such leavening imparted a sense of ambiguity and thus maintained Niebuhr's intellectual integrity -and arguably captured the genuinely gray complexity of conflicts and events -it had no policy import beyond evoking a sensibility of troubled gravitas. In the end, Niebuhr supported a Cold War foreign policy whose application could not be managed, whose rhetoric of the hardheaded invited and excused misuse, and whose negative externalities were probably intrinsic. 12 As the historian Christopher Lasch (1965: 300 -301) wrote:
12. In economics, externalities are costs that result from an activity and affect an otherwise uninvolved party who did not choose to incur those costs. I think it is a good concept to apply to the effects of the Cold War.
Downloaded from https://read.dukeupress.edu/public-culture/article-pdf/28/1 (78)/113/455468/0280113.pdf by UC SAN DIEGO LIBRARY user on 30 January 2018 Like many others, Niebuhr decided, in the late forties, that Soviet totalitarianism was a greater menace than American capitalism; but the effect of defining the choice as a choice between rival systems was to blind him to the possibility that systems as such were neither moral nor immoral and that the choices confronting an American intellectual in the late forties were not questions of ultimate allegiance, not questions of allegiance at all, but questions of tactics and strategy. Niebuhr had all along shown a tendency to exalt political issues beyond their real importance even while attacking the "utopians" for doing so -a tendency to which his preoccupation with the "tragedy" and "irony" of politics bore witness -and in the latter part of his career this habit of rhetorical inflation got completely out of hand. As a result, rhetoric increasingly took the place of social analysis in Niebuhr's writing. . . . Had he searched for the roots of American inflexibility in the social structure instead of in the national character . . . he might then have perceived a certain continuity between American policy abroad and the existence, at home, of what even President Eisenhower did not hesitate to call a "military-industrial complex" of potentially "disastrous" proportions.
Niebuhr's dialectics did not have much impact in moderating the worst elements of Cold War American foreign policy, and it is arguable that his typically troubled gravitas helped ease their acceptance. Thus the revival of Niebuhr in the current moment should give us pause. With the lessons of the Cold War and Niebuhrian hardheaded Christian realism harnessed now in support of the war on terror, we would do well to contemplate the extent to which the externalities of the war on terror, like the externalities of the Cold War, may be intrinsic to the policy itself. Torture and extraordinary rendition, drone-delivered executions, militarization of the border, ubiquitous surveillance, and an amorphous, stripped-down, but apparently permanent state of quasi-martial law, or what the social theorist Giorgio Agamben (2005) has described as "the state of exception," seem to be predictable by-products of our necessary, pragmatic, hardheaded war on terror.
